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ABSTRACT 
 
Compliance is necessary for successful management of the fisheries. In fact, to secure compliance, 
enforcement and surveillance, which are quite costly, are needed . It is realized that enforcement inputs 
in Indonesia is limited and not sufficient to watch the waters of this country. Therefore, it needs a lot of 
effort to improve the enforcement and surveillance schemes. It is necessary to find out new alternatives 
or paradigms of  monitoring, controlling and surveillance (MCS) in such a way in order to ensure the 
sustainability of the fisheries resource. 
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1 A portion  of  the  research umbrella on Evaluation of Compliance Behavior of Fishers in the Communities with Different Level 
of Participation in Co-Management Processes (Cmps): A Case Study in Central Java Fisheries. It was  presented in the the 6th 
Asian Fisheries Forum, at the National Sun Yat Sen University, Kaohsiung-Taiwan,  25-30 November 2001. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Indonesia, as a maritime country, consists 
of thousands of islands. In order to cover 
such a vast territory,  sufficient 
surveillance and enforcement fleets are 
needed. In fact, enforcement inputs in 
Indonesia are far from complete. This 
induces a higher rate of violation. To 
achieve a better fishing management,  high 
compliance towards the rules or 
regulations is required. It should be 
realized that to increase the compliance of 
fishers is something rather expensive for 
Indonesia, especially in Java sea fisheries. 
Without securing compliance of fishers, 
the efficiency of fisheries management will 
not be achieved properly. Nevertheless, a 
lot of effort have been spent to improve the 
compliance of fishers and other parties.  
The implementation of regulations 
inevitably requires an effective 
enforcement and controlling mechanism. 
The fishing situation could get worse if 
these regulations are violated. Many 
incidence of non-compliance by fishers 
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were found in Indonesia 
(Susilowati, 1998). This condition is 
perhaps shared by the lack of enforcement 
and surveillance inputs. Hence, high 
incidence of  non-compliance tends to 
make fisheries policies ineffective. 
Therefore, a rationale and fairness of the 
regulations and  sufficient in enforcement 
and surveillance efforts would  be 
considered as  important factors  in 
reaching  high compliance. 
Effective enforcement in 
Indonesian fishery is difficult to achieve in 
a short  period of time.. This is due to the 
physical difficulties involved in patrolling 
the long coastline.  Lack of enforcement 
resources also results in less effective 
control over the regulations imposed. 
Under situation of  economic down-turn in 
Indonesia, the budget and facilities  for 
enforcement and/or surveillance are 
dropped significantly. Moreover, people 
tend to back off on their commitment 
toward complying regulation.   Therefore, 
enforcement and surveillance activities to 
the fishery in Indonesia (including in Java 
sea) seem to be far from sufficient. 
 
 
 
MATERIAL AND METHODS 
 
The economics of fisheries law 
enforcement assessed by Sutinen and 
Andersen (1985) concluded that from both 
historical evidence and logical reasoning 
enforcement costs are a major determinant 
of regulatory policy for nonexclusive 
resources. Surveillance and enforcement 
operations are critical to the success of any 
system of fisheries management. Goodreau 
(1987) believed that without enforcement  
fisheries regulations will be ineffective. 
Only effective enforcement can prevent 
fisheries from deterioration (Sutinen and 
Kuperan, 1994). Incomplete enforcement 
could result in the non achievement of the 
expected objectives of fisheries 
management for the targeted fishery. 
Moreover, Sutinen and Hennessey (1985) 
examined the impact of enforcement under 
the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and 
Management Act of 1976 (MFCMA). 
They also exposed enforcement as the 
neglected element in fishery management. 
They raised a question on the assumption 
of most literature on fisheries management 
and regulation, i.e. laws can be perfectly 
enforced without cost. In fact, law 
enforcement is usually accounted as one of 
the legal or institutional problems 
(Kusumaatmadja et al., 1996) and usually 
imperfect in the fishery as affirmed by 
Sutinen and Andersen (1985). 
The model of non-compliance 
behaviour outlined by Kuperan (1993) was 
modified and enhanced by Susilowati 
(1998). She provided a cross-country 
comparison  for fishers’ non-compliance 
with the fisheries regulation in Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the Philippines. She 
prescribed that enforcement efforts should 
be given priority in Indonesia and the 
Philippines to achieve a better compliance, 
however costly enforcement might be.  
Thus, to improve the compliance level she 
suggested an exploration of the alternative 
approaches which is afforded by the 
respective country for managing the 
fisheries. One such strategy may be 
applied by introducing the co-management 
approach (Pomeroy et al., 1994). 
Methods used to analyse the study 
are descriptive statistics and descriptive 
qualitative. The study pulls together the 
diverse literatures and experiences of the 
previous studies (e.g. Goodreau, 1987; 
Sutinen and Hennessey, 1985; Sutinen and 
Andersen, 1985; Lepiz et al., 1985; 
Sutinen and Kuperan, 1994; 
Kusumaatmadja et al., 1996; Kuperan, 
1993; Susilowati, 1998, 1999, 2001) to 
explore the enforcement and surveillance 
profiles of the Java sea fisheries, especially 
by taking a closer look at the 
circumstances in the Pemalang and Demak 
Regencies, and interviewing fishers in 
Pemalang (n=85) and Demak (n=83).  
 
Journal of Coastal Development                                                                                                                                    ISSN: 1410-5217 
Volume 5, Number 3, June 2002 : 131-141                                                                                                    Accredited: 69/Dikti/Kep/2000 
133 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Enforcement Profile 
 
It is realized that law enforcement in 
Indonesia (at the national level) is very 
weak in all sectors, including in the 
fisheries. Susilowati (1998) found that 
enforcement intensity on the fisheries 
regulations for Malaysia is better than for 
Indonesia and the Philippines. More 
adversely, the enforcement intensity at the 
provincial levels such as in Central Java or 
at the regional level (e.g. in Pemalang and 
Demak) is weaker than at the national 
level. Nevertheless, there are efforts to 
improve the enforcement but with limited 
inputs. One of the reasonable alternatives 
is through empowering community with 
the traditional resource management 
concepts.  The revival of  the traditional 
system such as community-based fisheries 
resource management (CBFRM),  could 
hopefully prescribe a strategy use to 
enforce the rules and regulations in 
fisheries management. It seems this is a 
good complementary  effort to the formal 
enforcement that was not sufficient 
enough. Of course, the outcome of such 
enforcement is far from optimal, but 
perhaps this is  better than leaving  the 
fisheries resource in Indonesia without any 
efforts of enforcement and surveillance. 
Theoretically, there are three types of 
enforcement nodes (Sutinen, 1996), 
namely:     
 
(1) Dockside (On Land) 
 
The achievement status of enforcement 
process for fisheries’ law and regulation at 
sea and on land (dockside) are basically 
the same. The slight difference is only in 
the court process since it cannot be done at 
sea; the court process should be carried out 
on land (where the court is located). The 
“locus deliciti” concept is used to 
determine where the court process should 
be carried out at a place  nearest to the 
place of offence. Sanction and penalty 
should be imposed fairly with the offences 
according the valid law and regulation. 
 In general, enforcement of 
fisheries law and regulation has not been 
applied and  followed strictly yet. It is 
believed that many fishers have not 
completely understood about the existing 
rules and/or regulations. This is because 
the socialization of the rules or regulation 
is not sufficient enough to touch the grass-
root of society (fishers). Therefore, the 
information flows were not trickled down 
properly. It indeed needs an improvement 
of the information system in order to 
educate the society about the law or 
regulation. Thus, before  strict action or 
sanctions are imposed on the violators, 
fishers should be suggested to be aware of 
and  understand the rules. Of course many 
efforts have been made, and it is not easy 
to prevent the violations. Therefore, it is 
expected that fishers with their community 
should understand the rules or regulation 
and the laws as well. This is in order to 
have a better compliance for the fishers 
about the rule of the games in utilizing the 
fisheries resource. 
 
(2) At  Sea 
 
Under the existing scheme of enforcement, 
the Navy is appointed as the coordinator 
for enforcement activities for fisheries 
regulations in Indonesia. The enforcement 
team is comprised of the Navy, Water 
Police (Polisi Air), Fisheries Officer (the 
Division of Natural Resource 
Conservation), Harbors and Sea Security, 
Customs, Magistrate and Courts. The 
surveillance and enforcement activities 
arecarried out by using  fleets of warships  
(such as the KRI Teluk Bone) and it 
usually takes two weeks to cover the target 
area. Whenever the surveillance team 
found light violation (in Bahasa Indonesia: 
Tipiring or tindak pidana ringan), for 
example like catching traditional fishers  
operating the mini-trawl or using explosive 
or poisonous means for fishing, the 
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enforcement process will be carried out on 
the spot. If the team found rather serious 
violation such as illegal foreign fishing 
boat in Indonesian water, then the case will 
be brought to the court in the nearest 
magistrate district. 
 Actually,  the existing surveillance 
scheme is not only specified for 
monitoring the fisheries resource but also 
for multiple purposes and depend on the 
competent institutions involved in the 
operation. For example, one of the tasks of 
the Natural Resource Conservation 
Division in the Fisheries Office is to 
conserve the fisheries resource on the sea 
while the Customs has the obligation to 
watch for smuggling, and the Navy has to 
secure the national defense. Nowadays, the 
Fisheries Office promotes the concept of 
WASDI (in Bahasa Indonesia:  
pengawasan sumberdaya ikan) using their 
own fleets.  There are two boats which 
have been employed for this action in 
Central Java Province. WASDI is aimed to 
carry out surveillance of the fisheries 
resource to prevent  illegal fishing. This 
effort is expected to be more effective and 
efficient compared to the previous existing 
surveillance and enforcement scheme 
(where all activities became the burden of 
the Navy as the team coordinator). Sutinen 
and Andersen (1985) suggested that 
authorities have to realize that 
management and enforcement policies 
were interdependent and should be set 
simultaneously.  They also demonstrated 
that sea enforcement operations were 
significantly more expensive than dock-
side enforcement operations. 
 Under the WASDI scheme, the 
investigator will be recruited from the civil 
officer (called PPNS or Penyidik Pegawai 
Negeri Sipil) in the Fisheries Office rather 
than from the Navy. Therefore, they are 
expected to be more competent in the 
fisheries field and at the same time they 
can manage the WASDI activities better 
and more independently, especially in 
arranging the plan, timetable and needs. In 
this case, investigation results will be 
submitted to the state court for further 
process. Hence, it is expected that all 
violators will be prosecuted according to 
their offences. So far, many cases have 
been postponed or cancelled due to lack of  
evidence or wrong base of law, 
conspiracies, etc. which caused failure in 
the settlement of the offences. In the past,  
Fisheries Officers were just employed as   
expert witnesses  in  court,while in fact the 
officer should have had a more important 
role in the enforcement. Therefore, it is 
hoped that the WASDI scheme for the 
surveillance and enforcement will be more 
representative to improve the compliance 
behavior of fishers. 
 The statistics of fishers’ violation 
under the scheme of WASDI in Central 
Java Province in 2000 is summarized in 
the Appendix. During one year, 451 
violations of various types of fishing 
regulations were found. Almost all of the 
offences recorded by WASDI were permit 
violations. This is because surveillance 
and/or enforcement were mostly done in 
dockside and therefore violation of gear 
and zoning as well as means used for 
fishers  were not covered. Three hundred 
and sixty-three 363 verbal warnings (80% 
of the offences) were  issued to  violators 
as  first warnings and 11 cases as the 
second warning. About 35 percent of 
verbal warnings were ignored by violators 
and they were followed by  written 
warnings. Lately, it was reported that  two 
boats were  prohibited from operating 
perhaps due to severe violation. 
 
(3) In the Air 
 
At present no  air enforcement is available 
in Indonesia . This is due to the prohibitive  
cost of its implementation while the budget  
allocated for enforcement is very limited. 
In fact, as a maritime country, Indonesia 
really needs air surveillance and 
enforcement to cover and watch the vast  
fisheries territory.  
There are several reasons under-
lying  fishers’ violation of regulations, 
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among others: (1) thelengthy procedure to 
secure fishing permits; (2) lack of 
communication between Fisheries Officer 
or other competent institutions with fishers 
and their community; (3) lack of 
understanding of the available regulations 
and its contents. Fishers can not be claimed 
as the key-players of violation since other 
parties or stakeholders influenced the the 
system as well. WASDI’s statistics showed 
that many fishers violated regulations by 
not having  valid permits. Most of them  
claimed that due to the lengthy procedure 
in getting fishing permits it took more than 
three months to secure them . Such  
conditions need to be deregulated for 
efficiency purposes since delaying the 
permit process means the loss of economic 
opportunity or income to the fishers 
especially for the small-scale group of 
fishers. Fishers who do not want to wait 
for the permit to be approved by the 
authority would engage in non-compliance 
actions. Ideally, fishing permits should be 
processed in a one-day-stop service at the 
Provincial Fisheries Office or in the 
Regency Fisheries Office. Such a short cut  
will probably help the fishing industry 
progressively. 
 
Surveillance Profile 
 
The surveillance for fisheries and its 
enforcement for the regulations observed 
(restrictions of gears, zoning, means used 
for fishing and fishing permits) in the 
study area are very weak. The survey 
showed that almost 92 percent of 
respondents in Demak and 88 percent of 
respondents in Pemalang were never 
reminded by any parties to refrain from 
violating the regulations whenever they 
were engaged in non-compliance activities 
during fishing. This indicates that 
surveillance and enforcement activities in 
the study area are far from satisfactory. 
The surveillance nodes introduced by the 
Fisheries Office in Central Java as 
explained by a resource person, Achmad 
Muntholib
*
 (September 2001) are 
described as follows: 
 
(1) Dockside (In-Land) 
 
Lately,  Central Java Fisheries Office 
introduced a program for fishing 
surveillance called  WASDI
**
. The main 
objective of WASDI is to record the 
fishers’ activities at sea into a log-book 
provided. The specification of boat and 
gears used, boats’ tonnage, boats’ engine 
power, boats’ physical characteristics, 
number of crew, fishing permits, fishing 
grounds destination and catch 
characteristics should be reported to the 
WASDI team. The check-points of 
WASDI are located in the big TPIs 
(fishing landing or auction place); at 
present  there are 17 TPIs in the north and 
south coast of Central Java Province. 
WASDI is considered as a new program 
for surveillance and enforcement which is 
initiated by the Fisheries Office of Central 
Java in  2000/2001. However, it should be 
noticed that  the main constraints in the 
implementation of this program are lack of 
manpower and facilities. Ideally, the 
surveillance using the WASDI scheme 
should be established in every fishing 
landing or auction place (TPI) with proper 
facilities and manpower to handle the 
program in terms of quality as well as 
quantity, so that surveillance will be 
achieved optimally. 
 
(2) At Sea   
 
One node is surveillance at sea. To conduct 
sea surveillance needs input which is rather 
costly for Indonesian circumstances. Due 
to constraints in limited budget and 
manpower, therefore, the surveillance 
activity here is less frequent (at most twice  
a year). The existing surveillance scheme 
                                                 
* Extension Division, Fisheries Office Central Java 
Province. 
** Pengawasan Sumberdaya Ikan or Fisheries Resource 
Surveillance. 
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implemented  now usually came from the 
initiative of the Navy and/or the Sea Water 
Police (in Bahasa Indonesia: Polisi Air).  
Miscommunication among related 
institutions remains a classical problem in 
managing fisheries resources. Surveillance 
for fisheries resources is usually initiated 
by the Navy. In fact, the Navy has its own 
target to conduct sea surveillance operation 
at  sea, i.e. for national defense. Under this 
duty, the Navy may also be able to 
apprehend the suspected fishers. However, 
the main obligation for the Navy is to 
maintain national defense. Fishers who 
were arrested at sea by the Navy and/ or 
the unit of Polisi Air should be sent to the 
Fisheries Office for further process. 
However, in such situation sometimes the 
Fisheries Office is not ready yet to handle  
further processes. Therefore, many cases 
are hanging, pending, or cancelled. The 
ideal surveillance as expected by the 
Fisheries Office is that at least once in a 
month the integrated surveillance (with the 
competent entities, assuming the budget 
and manpower are available) should be 
conducted on a routine basis. 
 
(3) In the Air 
 
Today, surveillance and enforcement  of 
fisheries resource regulations from the air 
have not been conducted in Indonesia due 
to high  investment and operational costs. 
Remote sensing technology through 
satellite has been implemented to find fish 
schooling but not for surveillance 
activities. In order to conduct surveillance 
on a very vast area of maritime or fisheries 
resource, Indonesia should use air fleets 
for better efficiency in enforcement. 
However, it is prohibitively expensive. For 
that reason, therefore, surveillance and 
enforcement are not included in the air 
node. Hopefully, one day  air surveillance 
and enforcement to the fisheries resource 
of Indonesia will be applied. 
 
Enforcement and Surveillance Organi-
zation 
 
Indonesia is composed of about 17,500 
islands stretched out between Sabang in 
the western part to Merauke in the eastern 
part of Indonesia. Surveillance of the 
fisheries resources and  enforcement of its 
regulation can not be managed by a single 
entity (for instance the authorities only). It 
requires partnership among the competent 
stakeholders since surveillance and 
compliance are expensive actions. Thus, to 
improve the compliance achievement there 
is a need  to divert the shares  of the 
responsibility among the relevant parties, 
such as the Fisheries Office, Polisi air, the 
Navy, etc. Partnerships (or outsourcing)  
can reduce the uncertainty and failure of 
the action.  To ensure the compliance level  
efforts to enhance the enforcement of the 
regulation concerned is needed. The 
organization scheme of WASDI for 
surveillance and  enforcement  of   
fisheries resource in Indonesia is shown in 
Figure 1.                                         .
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Fishers          Custom              Magistrate      Local Gov.           Other Parties 
  Organization        Court 
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                                                           Enforcement and           
            Surveillance Action 
 
 
Figure 1:  Expected Organization Under WASDI Scheme 
 
The expected enforcement entity based on 
the perception of respondents showed that 
the government has been chosen as the 
expected coordinator of the entity as 
proposed by 73 respondents (88 percent) in 
Demak and 72 respondents (85 percent) in 
Pemalang. Only 59 persons (71 percent) 
and 56 persons (66 percent) of respondents 
agreed that   surveillance and enforcement 
activities should be coordinated by the 
community or society. The arbitrage entity 
was selected as the coordinator of 
surveillance and enforcement program by 
65 respondents (78 percent) in Demak and 
69 respondents (81 percent) in Pemalang. 
The detailed suggestions proposed by 
respondents is shown in Table 1.
 
Table 1. The Expected Enforcement and Surveillance Entity as Proposed by Respondents 
 
Description By Government By Community By Arbitrage Entity 
Demak Regency    
   Fully Disagree 2 (2.4%)) 2 (2.4%)   2 (2.4%) 
   Disagree  1 (1.2%)   3 (3.6%) 
   Don’t know 7 (8.4%) 20 (24.1%) 12 (14.5%) 
   Agree 48 (57.8%) 42 (50.6%) 59 (71.1%) 
   Totally agree 25 (30.1%) 17 (20.5%)   6 (7.2%) 
   Sub-total 82 (98.8%) 82 (98.8%) 82 (98.8%) 
   No reply 1 (1.2%) 1 (1.2%)   1 (1.2%) 
   Total 83 (100.0%) 83 (100.0%) 83 (100.0%) 
Pemalang Regency    
   Fully disagree 2 (2.4%) 2 (2.4%)   2 (2.4%) 
   Disagree  1 (1.2%)   2 (2.4%) 
   Don’t know 11 (12.9%) 26 (30.6%) 12 (14.1%) 
   Agree 51 (60.0%) 48 (56.5%) 66 (77.6%) 
   Totally agree 21 (24.7%) 8 (9.4%)   3 (3.5%) 
   Total 85 (100.0%) 85 (100.0%) 85 (100.0%) 
Source: Primary data, processed in 2001 
It seems that respondents in the 
study area perceived that the Government 
has the legitimacy to handle the 
responsibility of surveillance and 
enforcement program for fisheries 
resource. This is proved by the highest 
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nomination for the coordinator for 
enforcement and surveillance that goes to 
the Government entity and followed by the 
role of stakeholders. The most  effective 
enforcement effort as perceived by 
respondents in order to improve fisher’s 
compliance is shown in Table 2.
 
Table 2. The Most Effective Enforcement Efforts to Improve Fishers’ Compliance as 
Perceived by Respondents 
 
Description Freq. % 
Demak Regency   
  No reply         64        77.1 
  Strict enforcement: boats and permits 1 1.2 
  Enforcement should be in collaboration with the Navy 1 1.2 
  Restrict environmentally unfriendly gears but 
  provide gear substitutes  
6 7.2 
  Empower local fishers 1 1.2 
  Empower all stakeholders 5 6.0 
  Enforcement restricted  to large-scale fishers only 3 3.6 
  Restriction should be applied fairly in all regions 2 2.4 
  Total          83       100.0 
Pemalang Regency   
  No reply         67        78.8 
  Strict officers 1 1.2 
  Good cooperation 1 1.2 
  Restriction should be applied fairly in all regions 1 1.2 
  Restriction but provide  alternative gear 1 1.2 
  All stakeholders should be involved 2 2.4 
  Routine enforcement operation  5 5.9 
  Comprehensive enforcement 3 3.5 
  Enforcement restricted to large-scale fishers only 2 2.4 
  All destructive gears are banned 2 2.4 
  Total          85      100.0 
Source: Primary data, processed in 2001. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The effectiveness of law enforcement in 
Indonesian fishery could hardly be 
achieved in a short time due to several 
factors such as the long coastline and 
dispersed locations of the. Theoretically, 
the level of compliance of fishers  can be 
improved by increasing    the  enforcement  
efforts,   but this is not very practical 
because it involves a  lot of  budget. 
Therefore, the fisheries management 
authorities should explore  alternative 
strategies to perform surveillance on 
fisheries resources. One alternative is 
through the empowerment of stakeholders, 
particularly to seek help from the fishing 
community, perhaps via  community-based 
or co-management approaches (Pomeroy et 
al., 1994). 
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APPENDIX 
Statistics of Fishers' Violation and Its Treatment 
 Central Java Fisheries Under WASDI Scheme, Year 2000 
No Month Fish Landings  Types of Violation Case Treatments 
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  or Auctions A B C D E Total Verbal 
Warning 
Written 
Warning 
SS PU Other
s 
         I II I II    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
                
1 January PPNP - 10 - - - 10 10 - - - - - - 
  PPNC - - 12 22 - 34 34 - 34 - - - - 
  PPI Bajomulyo - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
  PPI Klidang Lor 8 8 2 6 - 24 13 - - - - - - 
  PPI Pelabuhan - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
                
2 February PPNP - 2 - - - 2 2 - - - - - - 
  PPNC - - 12 27 - 39 39 - 20 - - - - 
  PPI Bajomulyo - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
  PPI Klidang Lor 5 5 5 8 - 23 11 - - - - - - 
  PPI Pelabuhan - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
                
3 March PPNP 1 2 - - - 3 10 - - - - - - 
  PPNC - - 5 20 - 25 25 - - - - - - 
  PPI Bajomulyo - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
  PPI Klidang Lor 11 11 1 4 - 27 13 - 14 - - - - 
  PPI Pelabuhan - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
                
4 April PPNP - 2 - - - 2 2 - - - - - - 
  PPNC - - 27 14 6 47 47 - 47 - - - - 
  PPI Bajomulyo - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
  PPI Klidang Lor 6 6 1 3 - 16 10 - 6 - - - - 
  PPI Pelabuhan - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
                
5 May PPNP - - 1 - - 1 - - - - 1 - - 
  PPNC - - 3 - - 3 3 - 3 - - - - 
  PPI Bajomulyo 6 6 - - - 12 6 - 6 - - - - 
  PPI Klidang Lor - - 4 - - 4 4 3 - - - - - 
  PPI Pelabuhan - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
                
6 June PPNP - - 1 - - 1 - - - - 1 - - 
  PPNC - - 6 - - 6 6 - 6 - - - - 
  PPI Bajomulyo 9 9 - - - 18 9 - 9 - - - - 
  PPI Klidang Lor 2 4 3 - 1 10 7 3 - - - - - 
  PPI Pelabuhan - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
                
7 July PPNP - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
  PPNC - - 7 - - 7 7 - 7 - - - - 
  PPI Bajomulyo 6 6 - - - 12 6 - - - - - - 
  PPI Klidang Lor - - 2 - 4 6 6 - - - - - - 
  PPI Pelabuhan - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
                
8 August PPNP - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
  PPNC - - 5 - - 5 5 - 5 - - - - 
  PPI Bajomulyo 11 11 - - - 22 11 - - - - - - 
  PPI Klidang Lor 2 2 2 1 - 7 5 2 - - - - - 
  PPI Pelabuhan - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
                
9 September PPNP - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
  PPNC - - 5 - - 5 5 - 5 - - - - 
  PPI Bajomulyo 12 12 - - - 24 24 - - - - - - 
  PPI Klidang Lor 2 - 3 - - 5 4 1 - - - - - 
  PPI Pelabuhan - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
                
10 October PPNP - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
  PPNC ? ? ? - - ? ? - ? - - - - 
  PPI Bajomulyo 10 10 - - - 20 10 - - - - - - 
  PPI Klidang Lor 3 2 - - - 5 5 - - - - - - 
  PPI Pelabuhan - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
 
11 November PPNP ? ? - - - - - - - - - - - 
  PPNC ? ? ? - - ? ? ? - - - - - 
  PPI Bajomulyo 2 2 - - - 4 4 - - - - - - 
  PPI Klidang Lor - 2 6 - - 8 6 2 - - - - - 
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  PPI Pelabuhan - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
                
12 December PPNP ? ? - - - - - - - - - - - 
  PPNC ? ? ? - - ? ? ? - - - - - 
  PPI Bajomulyo 2 2 - - - 4 4 - - - - - - 
  PPI Klidang Lor 5 5 - - - 10 10 - - - - - - 
  PPI Pelabuhan - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
                
 Total  103 119 113 105 11 451 363 11 156 - 2 - - 
 %  23% 26% 25% 23% 2% 100% 80% 2% 35%  0,4%   
 
Notes : 
              
Types of Violation              
A. The xerox copy of fishing firm's permits are not available          
B. The original copy of the respective permits are not available         
C. The permits in A and B are available but expired           
D. The specification of physical conditions are not match with the specification printed in permits     
     Example: Boat GT capacity is not tally with the specification printed in permits       
                       Boat HP capacity is not tally with the specification printed in permits       
                       Gears used is not tally with the specification printed in permits        
                       Number and composition of boat crew are not tally with the specification printed in permits    
                       Size of storage capacity is not tally with the specification printed in permits      
E.    : Others               
SS.  : Operation is prohibited temporaily            
PU   : Case is brought to the court             
Others               
                
Source: WASDI Program Report, Fisheries Office of Central Java Province  (2001).       
                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
